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I. INTRODUCTION
Globalization and increasing international flows of goods and capital
have created a sense that the importance of individual nation states and
the public goods they provide, including law and law enforcement insti-
tutions, is in decline.' Opting out of domestic legal institutions and into
those of a third country or into an "international" architecture have been
elevated to important complements, if not substitutes for "good" institu-
tions at home.2 If traders and investors could indeed effectively opt-out
of their home jurisdiction's legal systems, we should observe empirically
that the quality of domestic institutions has little impact on international
patterns of trade flows. Yet, empirical studies suggest the opposite,
namely that a country's domestic legal institutions have strong explana-
tory power for its integration in international markets .
Part II of this paper explains this empirical observation. Why do do-
mestic legal institutions matter, and why can trading parties-in
particular exporters of complex goods-not easily opt-out of their do-
mestic legal institutions? We argue that domestic institutions remain
important even in a globalized world, because they are the final option
1. But see, Paul Hirst, The Global Economy-Myths and Realities, 73 INT. AFF. 409
(1997) (arguing that the world economy has been global already for a long time and that state
sovereignty and state institutions are as important as ever).
2. For a domestic "opt-out" see Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extra-
legal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992). Piggy-
backing on another country's laws and legal institutions has been advocated particularly in the
area of financial market regulation. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National
Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1855 (1997) and Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulations, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998). Following the
East Asian Financial crisis of 1997-98 the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) have propagated the building of an "international financial architecture." See WORLD
BANK GROUP, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE, at http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/
ifa more.html (also showing that the focal points of this effort are the local institutions of
countries whose institutional framework is perceived to be weak, thus making the country
vulnerable to crisis).
3. DANI RODRIK et al., INSTITUTIONS RULE: THE PRIMACY OF INSTITUTIONS OVER
GEOGRAPHY AND INTEGRATION IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 9305, 2002); JAMES E. ANDERSON & DOUGLAS MARCOUILLER,
TRADE, INSECURITY, AND HOME BIAS: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 7000, 1999). See also Daniel Berkowitz et al., Trade, Law and
Product Complexity (2004) (submitted for publication)(hereinafter denoted as BMP).
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for enforcing a claim against a party in the event of a breach of contract.
International contracts take place in the shadow of the parties' home in-
stitutions. Unless parties can negotiate a settlement, or the losing party
voluntarily complies with a foreign court or arbitration ruling, the win-
ning party must seek enforcement against the assets of the losing party-
and they tend to be located primarily in that party's home jurisdiction.
For reasons further explained below, importers and exporters are not
equally exposed to the risk of bad domestic institutions' actions. By im-
plication, exports, and particularly complex goods exports suffer more
from bad legal institutions in the exporter's home jurisdiction, than im-
ports.
The second goal of this paper is to identify the factors that influence
a country's performance on institutional quality indices as well as the
channel through which they influence trade. In order to do so, the effect
of domestic (Part II) and of international legal institutions (Part III) on
trade are distinguished. We find strong empirical evidence that the qual-
ity of domestic legal institutions-as measured by perception
indicators-is positively associated with a country's exports in complex
goods. These results are explained using incomplete contract theory. We
also find that international laws, in particular a country's ratification of
key international treatises affects trade patterns. The mechanism through
which international laws affect trade outcomes is a change in the percep-
tion of a country's credibility to commit to impartial contract
enforcement. Ratification of such a treaty--even in the absence of tangi-
ble institutional change-sends an easily verifiable signal to foreign
entrepreneurs. We use case study analysis (Indonesia) to explore the im-
portance of domestic institutional change for lending greater credibility
to the signaling effect resulting from the ratification of an international
convention. A positive effect on both trade patterns and perception indi-
ces can be achieved by signaling alone. The signaling effect, however,
can be undermined by events that raise doubts about a country's willing-
ness to adhere to its legal commitments. These findings lead to a review
of the use of perception data for measuring institutional quality. We ar-
gue that perception data are critical, because they are part of potential
traders' or investors' risk assessment. Moreover, our finding that the sig-
naling effect of ratification results in change of economic behavior
through changes in perception of quality of institutions addresses a re-
cent critique about validity of these institutional quality measures.'
4. For a criticism of these perception indices, see Edward L. Glaeser et al., Explaining
Growth: Institutions, Human Capital, and Leaders (Mar. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, pre-
pared for the Brookings Panel on Economic Activity).
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II. EFFECT OF DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS ON TRADE
Trade has long been identified as an important variable in explaining
economic growth and development.5 There is a voluminous literature that
seeks to explain the propensity of countries around the globe to partici-
pate in international trade flows. 6 More recently, trade economists have
discovered the role of legal institutions as possible determinants for in-
ternational trade flows. In a recent paper Subramanian, Rodrik and
Trebbi use statistical techniques to demonstrate that the quality of a
country's institutions is a much more important determinant of economic
growth than either its location or trade patterns.7 Using instrumental
variable techniques they provide evidence suggesting that good institu-
tions cause trade rather than the other way around. Anderson and
Marcouiller suggest that "good" legal institutions are important particu-
larly for the importing country. The reason is that in a weak institutional
environment corrupt officials may use their gatekeeper function at the
border to extract bribes and rents. Other authors focus on the role of in-
formal networks as alternatives to formal legal institutions.9
The empirical result that the quality of the trading parties' domestic
institutions has a statistically significant effect on trade challenges pre-
sumptions commonly made in the legal literature, namely that parties to
international trade transactions can effectively contract around defective
domestic institutions.' ° Parties may certainly opt into the law of the im-
porter country or that of a third country, if they choose to do so.
5. WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC POL-
ICY, 292-304 (1993).
6. Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew Warner, Economic Convergence and Economic Policies,
I BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1-118 (1995); Romain Wacziarg & Karen
Horn Welch, Trade Liberalization and Growth: New Evidence (Nov. 2003), available at
http://papers.ssm.consol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=471941.
7. RODRIK, supra note 3.
8. James E. Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade: An
Empirical Investigation, 84 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 344, 345-52 (2002).
9. ALESSANDRA CASELLA & JAMES RAUCH, OVERCOMING INFORMATIONAL BARRIERS
TO INTERNATIONAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION: PRICES AND GROUP TIES (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 6628, 1998).
10. See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL ORDER
(John M. Conley & William M. O'Barr, eds., 1996). In Chapter One of this book, the two
authors state that:
When businesses enter into transnational relationships such as contracts for the sale
of goods, joint ventures, construction projects, or distributorships, the contract typi-
cally calls for private arbitration in the event of any dispute arising out of the
contractual agreement. The main reason given today for this choice is that it allows




Moreover, international efforts to standardize law have created a com-
mon legal framework for key aspects of contract law." Finally, parties
can choose where future disputes shall be resolved. They may opt for
courts in one of their countries or refer disputes to the courts in a "neu-
tral" jurisdiction. Instead of choosing courts, they may also submit their
disputes to arbitration, including arbitration in a third country or to an
international arbitration tribunal, such as the International Arbitration
Court at the International Chamber of Commerce.'
2 If the choice of law
or forum could fully insulate transacting parties from the negative impact
of "bad" legal institutions, we should not find these domestic institutions
to have a strong and statistically significant impact on international trade
flows. An important insight of the empirical studies thus is that private
parties cannot fully insulate their transactions from domestic legal insti-
tutions.
The reason why full insulation of private contracts from defunct le-
gal institutions in their home jurisdiction is difficult, if not impossible, is
that one of the trading partners-and the exporter more than the im-
porter-may rely on his home country's defective institutions to avoid
contractual liability in case of dispute. International harmonization of
law may lower the propensity of dispute, but once a dispute has arisen,
domestic enforcement of international rulings is the Achilles heel of
transnational relations. Using third country courts or arbitration tribunals
may solve the problem of effective dispute resolution, but this does not
ensure compliance with the final ruling. If the losing party chooses to
ignore the ruling, the winning party has to execute it by making use of
courts, bailiffs, and other execution organs in a place where that party
has assets. Since the defendant's most valuable assets tend to be located
in his home jurisdiction, the institutions in the exporter's country of ori-
gin ultimately determine whether or not the winning party can enforce
her claim.
In principle, both the importer and the exporter can find themselves
in a position where they have to execute a foreign court or arbitration
award. In practice, however, exporters can more effectively protect
11. The most important example to date is the International Convention on Contracts
for the Sale of Goods (CISG). To date, 29 countries have adopted CISG. For the period cov-
ered by our trade data (1982-1992) only sixteen countries in the sample had ratified the
convention. Even for countries that have ratified the convention, it is not uncommon for pri-
vate parties to explicitly opt-out of its provisions. This has been attributed to uncertainties
about the interpretation of the convention's provisions. See Paul B. Stephan, The Futility 
of
Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. OF INT'L L. 743
(1999); Steven Walt, Novelty and the Risks of Uniform Sales Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 671
(1999).
12. See International Chamber of Commerce, at http://www.iccwbo.org/home/menu-
international_arbitration.asp.
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themselves against breach of contract than importers. They can, for ex-
ample, require pre-payment or bills of exchange "on first demand," or
engage reliable intermediaries where payment can be deposited until the
goods have been delivered (e.g. letter of credit). 3 These mechanisms
have been tried and tested in long-distance trade for centuries and are a
common feature of the international landscape today.'5 Thus, exporters
can be reasonably assured that they will get paid for the goods they de-
liver. It is substantially more difficult for the importer to enforce a
contractual claim against the exporter, should the goods prove to be de-
fective. To be sure, importers are not helpless either. They may hire third
party inspection and testing agents in the exporter's location before
shipping, negotiate for inspection periods, and withhold payment until
the state of the goods has been verified. This does not protect them,
however, against defects that are not immediately apparent and will
therefore be discovered only long after reasonable inspection periods
have expired-and after they have fully paid for the goods. At this stage
all they have is a legal claim. The contract may allow them to file the
claim at an arbitration tribunal in a third country. As long as the exporter
is willing to comply with such a ruling, this mechanism will work to the
benefit of the importer. Should the exporter not be so inclined, however,
the importer must execute the arbitration tribunal's decision. This typi-
cally implies that she must use the courts in a country where the exporter
has assets, which will tend to be his home jurisdiction. Put differently,
the domestic institutions in the exporter's home country are the ultimate
fallback option for effective contract enforcement. Uncertainty about the
reliability of these institutions affects the importer's willingness to trade
with firms from that country.
13. See GRADY MILLER, The Legal and Economic Basis of International Trade, in THELEGAL AND ECONOMIC BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 169-83 (1996)(discussing the busi-
ness origins of trade finance).
14. See FERNAND BRAUDEL, SOZIALGESCHICHTE DES 15.-18. JAHRHUNDERTS
(19 8 5 )(19 79)(discussing the history of bills of exchange in long-distance trade). According toBraudel, the origins of the bill of exchange can be traced to problems that resulted from thecomplexity of barter arrangements in long distance trade. The use of bills of exchange allowedparties to receive payments for their goods before goods that were bartered had been received
or sold to a third party. The price contracting parties paid for this financial service was a dis-count on the original purchase price. See also Rufus James Trimble, The Law Merchant andthe Letter of Credit, 61 HARV. L. REV. 981, 983-86 (19 4 8)(suggesting that the origins of let-ters of credit can be traced back to the ancient Egyptians, Phoenicians, and Greeks).15. See U.C.C. REVISED ARTICLE 5: LETTERS OF CREDIT prefatory note, at xv (Pro-posed Final Draft 19 9 5 )(commenting that "nearly $500 billion standby letters of credit areissued annually worldwide, of which $250 are issued in the United States". See also ANNUAL
SURVEY OF LETTER OF CREDIT LAW & PRACTICE (James E. Byrne & Christopher S. Byrnes
eds., 2 0 04)(containing more recent data on the use of letters of credits in international trade).
[Vol. 26:163
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Uncertainty about the quality of domestic institutions should, in
principle, not discriminate among product categories. Still, building on16
the existing literature on incomplete contracts in economics there are
good reasons to believe it does. Exporters, who must persuade their buy-
ers that they will ship goods of an appropriate quality and assortment,
depend more on the quality of their domestic institutions than importers,
who must persuade their trading partners that they will pay for ship-
ments. The basic intuition of the incomplete contract theory is that the
ability to verify compliance with or breach of contract influences parties'
behavior at the contracting stage. Contracting parties cannot foresee all
future contingencies and therefore cannot possibly write a complete con-
tract that addresses all of them, avoiding disputes and thus eliminating
the need to revert to the courts for dispute settlement and enforcement.
This proposition also implies that it may be possible to write relatively
more complete contracts for some transactions than for others and that
this will depend on the relative potential to verify breach at a later stage.
Sales contracts, for example, can govern different types of goods. The
simpler and more standardized the type of product, the more complete
the contract and the easier verification of breach of contract.
Examples of simple goods are natural resources, such as oil, copper
or gold. While there may be important differences in the purity of these
resources, these can still be specified by the parties ex ante and easily
verified by way of inspection ex post. An example for a complex good is
a computer network system for a company, which has to be adapted to
the specific needs of the customer. Most goods that are traded interna-
tionally fall somewhere in between these two extremes. Grain is a fairly
simple good, but the fact that the Grain and Feed Trade Association
(GAFTA) lists eighty different contract types on its web page suggests
that grain can come in various types and qualities.
7 Still, it is substan-
tially more difficult to write a fairly complete contract for complex
goods, as the following example illustrates. In a case governed by the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (CISG) and ultimately ruled upon by the German Supreme Court
16. The literature goes back to the seminal paper, Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D.
Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 
J.
POL. ECON. 691-719 (1986)(using incomplete contract theory to explain the function of own-
ership). For a recent account of the foundations and use of incomplete contract theory, see
Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. EcON. STUD. 115-
38 (1999); but see Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete
Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 83-114 (1999)(criticizing the conceptual framework com-
monly used in the incomplete contract literature).
17. GAFTA, at http://www.gafta.com/New/NewContracts.htm.
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(Bundesgerichtshof),' 8 a German party had sold a printing system to an
Austrian party. The contract included the following warranty:
The warranty covers software and hardware as a unit. (...) In
the event that a subsequent malfunction of a defect appears later,
the buyer shall give prompt written notice of this fact to the
[seller].... If cure of the defect fails twice, the buyer may then,
according to his choice, reduce the purchase price or declare the
contract avoided.' 9
On January 30, 1993, the printer was installed and handed over for op-
eration on February 8. The buyer informed the seller by letter dated
February 9 that several points remained "open," including
"[d]ocumentation of the [p]rinter" and requested that this should be rec-
tified by February 25. The seller responded with letter dated February 11
announcing delivery of documentation in the seventh calendar week. In
subsequent correspondence the printer documentation was not men-
tioned anymore, but the parties discussed the documentation for the
software that came with the printer unit. The buyer eventually rescinded
the contract on the grounds that the seller had failed twice to cure the
defect. During litigation the question arose, whether reference to the
missing "documentation of the printer" in the buyer's first complaint
implied documentation for the entire unit, including for the software.
This was important, because only then could buyer claim that the seller
failed twice to cure the defect. The appellate court ruled in favor of the
buyer; however the German Supreme Court reversed by arguing that the
malfunctioning elements of the contract had to be specified individually
and that a general reference to "documentation of the printer" did not
include the software.2°
The case demonstrates that a simple warranty clause designed to
clearly allocate rights and responsibilities between the contracting par-
ties raises complicated questions of interpretation in the case of complex
goods. The parties clearly did not anticipate the possibility that they
would dispute over whether failure to deliver printer documentation
would amount to a product defect, much less the meaning of "documen-
tation of the printer." The problem surrounding the delivery of proper
documentation arose only because the printer unit was a highly complex
good the proper functioning of which depended on correct operation
based on specific documentation.





Problems of this kind are far less likely to arise with simple goods.
The typical "defective good" cases involve cases of delivery of the
wrong good (i.e. Australian summer wheat instead of winter wheat), or
the meaning of average quality when bulk goods are delivered. These
problems tend to get resolved by reference to business practice, i.e. what
a reasonable contracting party would have expected. The more complex
the goods, however, the more likely it is that additional misunderstand-
ings occur and the more difficult it is to identify a common business
practice. As a result, the propensity of disputes (and their costs) in-
creases and so does the importance of legal institutions charged with
resolving them.
We tested the proposition that exporters of complex goods are more
vulnerable to institutional quality in their home jurisdiction than export-
ers using the trade data of fifty-five countries obtained from the World
Trade Database compiled by Statistics Canada.
2 The time period we
cover is the period from 1982 to 1992. In order to differentiate between
complex and simple goods we use the classification developed by
Rauch,22 who sorts four digit SITC industries into trading categories:
23
those goods that are predominantly traded on organized exchanges (met-
als, pork), and all other goods that are not, including those that neither
have reference prices nor are traded on an organized exchange (e.g.,
shoes, cars, and machinery). We simplify the classification by distin-
guishing only between simple goods, i.e. those that are traded on an
international exchange, and complex goods, which are not. Clearly, this
classification does not allow for a more fine grained analysis of rela-
tively more complex goods. The benefit of differentiating only between
two different product types, however, is that it avoids the need for sub-
jective classifications of relatively more or less complex goods.
For the data on the quality of legal institutions we use survey data
from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
4 We use four indices
21. These 55 countries are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium-Luxemburg, Bolivia,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, 
France,
Germany FR, Ghana, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, 
Italy,
Japan, Kenya, Korea (Republic), Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand,
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, 
the United
Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
22. James E. Rauch, Networks Versus Markets in International Trade, 48 J. 
INT'L
ECON. 7-35 (1999).
23. SITC stands for "standard international trade classification." See U.N. Statistics
Division, at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst. asp.
24. The ICRG data are explained in Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions 
and
Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 
7
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of this data set: rule of law; expropriation risk; corruption in govern-
ment; and bureaucratic quality; and compute them into a simple average.
For each indicator respondents are asked to rank a country on a scale
from one to ten on the relevant item with higher numbers indicating bet-
ter quality.
Consistent with other studies,25 we find that legal institutions do in-
deed matter for international trade flows. Countries with higher ratings
on institutional quality experience greater trade flows. The impact of
institutions is of a similar statistical relevance as gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita, distance between countries, and language differences,
all indicators that are well established as important determinants of in-
ternational trade flows. Previous work, however, did not distinguish
between simple and complex goods. Using the classification of simple
versus complex goods discussed above, we find that the quality of legal
institutions is substantially more important for exporters than for import-
ers. In fact, we reject the null hypothesis that the quality of legal
institutions has the same effect for exporter and importer countries at the
ten percent level. Furthermore, we find that the overall impact of institu-
tions for exporters is much stronger for complex versus simple
products. 6
An alternative explanation for our results could be that for goods that
are traded on international commodities exchanges, alternative enforce-
ment mechanisms exist allowing parties to opt-out of domestic
institutions. Contracting parties may use dispute resolution at exchanges
or trade associations and rely on informal mechanisms, including reputa-
tion bonds or expulsion from such organizations rather than domestic
institutions as their ultimate enforcement devices.2 7 This explanation
would be fully consistent with the literature on early long distance trade
as well as recent studies on trade among Chinese business networks in
Southeast Asia. Avner Greif, for example, explains the resilience of long-
distance trade in the Mediterranean in early modern times with strong
ethnically based networks of trading intermediaries, the Maghribi trad-
ers, who relied heavily on reputation bonds and their ability to ostracize
breaching parties.28 Similarly, Lisa Bernstein has investigated enforce-
ment mechanisms among traders at the Diamond Exchange in New York
25. See supra note 3.
26. BMP, supra note 3, at 36, t.4.
27. For a discussion of non-legal sanctions in general, see Anthony T. Kronman, Con-
tract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 5 (1985). For a more specific
discussion on non-legal sanctions in commercial relations, see David Chamy, Nonlegal Sanc-
tions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 375 (1990).
28. Avner Greif et al., Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the
Merchant Guild, 102 J. POL. ECON. 745 (1994).
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and elsewhere and has documented in great detail the non-legal sanctions
that exist and function as effective substitutes for legal enforcement
mechanisms. 29 Finally, Rauch and Casella suggest that business networks
among the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia support long-distance
trade in this part of the world.30 Even absent ethnic or religious ties, ef-
fective enforcement mechanisms may be established at organized trade
fairs. Historical examples include the trade fairs of the Middle Ages,
such as the Champagne fares. The "law merchant" functioned primarily
as a central source of information about unreliable trading partners, as
failure to comply with past rulings would be recorded and the informa-
tion shared with other merchants.'
We cannot fully rule out that alternative enforcement mechanisms
account for some of the results we observe. Closer analysis of dispute
resolution mechanisms at commodities exchanges or trade associations
specializing in different product categories, however, revealed little evi-
dence of enforcement mechanisms that could effectively substitute for
domestic institutions. Few international commodities exchanges have
active arbitration tribunals that resolve disputes among buyers and sellers
of such commodities. They typically offer such services to their own
members or to brokers: not, however, to the ultimate buyers and sellers
of the commodities traded on the exchange. Apart from commodity ex-
changes, trade associations can offer alternative mechanisms for
resolving contractual disputes in international trade. There are numerous
trade associations specializing in different product categories. Most in-
ternational trade associations, however, do not offer quasi-legal services.
We surveyed eighty-two international trade associations,
32 but found only
three that offered dispute resolution to their members, GAFTA, the Coca
Association of London, and the Liverpool Cotton Association.
33 The ab-
sence of institutionalized dispute resolution mechanisms does not
29. Bernstein, supra note 2.
30. ALESSANDRA CASELLA & JAMES E. RAucH, ANONYMOUS MARKETS AND GROUP
TIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6186,
1997). See also, James E. Rauch & Vitor Trindade, Ethnic Chinese Networks in International
Trade, 84 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 116 (2002); Rauch, supra note 22. For a theoretical discussion on
the role of middlemen in trade relations, see Janet T. Landa, A Theory of The Ethnically Ho-
mogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL
STUD. 349 (1981).
31. Paul R. Milgrom et al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law
Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1-23 (1990).
32. We defined an "international" trade association as one that had members from at
least 2 different countries. We surveyed their web pages and sent out an e-mail as well as a
letter to each (data on file with the authors).
33. Notably, all three associations specialize in simple goods. The reverse, however,
does not hold. In other words, not all associations specializing in simple goods offer dispute
resolution to their members.
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exclude the possibility that membership in the association serves as a
bonding device and limits shirking, as information about non-compliant
members can be easily disseminated. Still, even those trade associations
that do offer arbitration, do not rely on expulsion or blacklisting to en-
force arbitration rulings, but refer disputes over these rulings to state
courts. GAFTA, for example, refers disputes over the arbitration awards
to English courts. 4 This suggests that contracting in the shadow of state
enforcement mechanisms is preferred over a purely self-enforcing re-
gime, even though the execution of a court ruling ultimately requires
involvement of one of the parties' domestic courts.
III. EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ON TRADE
Our finding that the quality of domestic institutions is important for
a country's participation in international trade flows-in particular of
complex goods-challenges the proposition that international economic
law can substitute for domestic institutions.35 In this part of the paper, the
potential of international law to act as a substitute for domestic institu-
tions is further explored.
In assessing the reach of international law on private transactions it
is important to note that dispute resolution mechanisms under interna-
tional law typically address sovereign States. Some are designed to
resolve disputes between States-such as arbitration at the World Trade
Organization (WTO).36 Others enable private parties to hold States ac-
countable for breach of contract and/or violation of treaty obligations.
An example is the International Convention for the Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes (ICSID).37 Similarly, under the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), private parties can invoke arbitration to re-
solve disputes with one of the Member States.3" Moreover, European
Union law enables private parties to seek judicial review of State actions
that violate a Member State's commitments. Only domestic courts of a
34. A search of UK case law on Lexis renders 173 hits for GAFTA, 59 for FOSFA, and
14 for the Cocoa Association of London, with other associations trailing far behind. Search
was last conducted in spring 2001. (Data on file with the authors).
35. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
36. The rules for dispute settlement under the WTO are set forth in the Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding (DSU) the "Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
Disputes" which were adopted as part of the Uruguay trade negotiations. The full text of the
DSU is available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/28-dsu.pdf.
37. For a discussion of ICSID, see infra note 78 and accompanying text.
38. Under Chapter 11 of NAFTA investors can seek legal review of unequal treatment
in one of the member states. They can refer the disputes to arbitration at ICSID, supra note 40,




Member State may refer a case to the European Court of Justice, how-
ever.39 Execution of rulings against a sovereign Member State takes the
form of other States employing sanctions against it, such as trade sanc-
tions authorized by the WTO arbitration tribunals. a
By contrast, private parties have to employ domestic institutions of a
sovereign State to enforce foreign court or arbitration awards. The clos-
est there is to a supranational enforcement mechanism for private parties
is the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (NY Convention).
4' The NY Conven-
tion requires all Member States to enforce arbitration awards issued
outside their own jurisdiction without having their own courts reviewing
the substance of the award. By implication, contracting parties can agree
to submit their disputes to arbitration in a third country and can seek en-
forcement in the home jurisdiction of the losing party without being
extensively exposed to local courts. The NY Convention allows countries
to refuse enforcement in exceptional cases, but these exceptions are, for
the most part, narrowly defined.42 The most general opt-out possibility is
that an arbitration award is found to violate a country's ordre public-or
public policy. This rationale, however, has been invoked only occasion-
ally as most countries have interpreted public policy as referring to the
fundamental principles, not any inconsistency with domestic law.
3
39. See Treaty on the European Union, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 234. The full text of the
consolidated version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community is available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/EC-consol.pdf.
40. Under procedures set forth in the DSU, supra note 36, in case of failure to comply,
countries that have invoked dispute resolution shall first seek amicable settlement. In case that
fails, they can obtain authorization from the dispute settlement body (DSB) to suspend obliga-
tions and concessions under the relevant WTO agreement vis-a-vis that state. See supra note
36, at art. 22(2).
41. See ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF
1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION (1981)(providing a detailed review of
the history of the convention and its implications). Berg examines 140 cases from 18 countries
that interpreted the NY Convention between 1958 and 1980. He finds a remarkably consistent
interpretation of its main provisions, at least at the time of his writing when only 56 countries
had adhered to the convention. Since then, the number of member states has increased to 134.
42. New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (1959), art. V.l(a) [hereinafter NY Convention].
43. Albert Jan van den Berg reports that, "contrary to what was feared by some directly
after the adoption of the Convention that the Convention's public policy provisions could be
used by the courts to take away a great deal of its effectiveness, the courts have refused en-
forcement in very exceptional cases only.... In fact, although the public policy provisions are
frequently invoked, out of some 140 decisions, enforcement of an arbitration agreement and
an arbitral award was refused in five decisions only on account of public policy." Berg, supra
note 41 at 366. Note, however, that at the time of his writing, fewer states had ratified the
convention. Compare William Isaacson, Enforcement Difficulties are Increasing, 25 NAT'L L.
J. 89 (2002) for a more recent account on problems with enforcing arbitral awards.
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While the NY convention does not set up a supranational court or
arbitration tribunal, it could nevertheless qualify as an international insti-
tution. The literature on institutions in the social sciences defines
institutions as "rules of the game in a society, or more formally, [as] the
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction (... )." The
rules may be formal, i.e. constitutions, laws, or formal contracts, or in-
formal, such as reputation bonds, or relational contracts. Aoki takes the
analysis of institutions a step further and defines them as "sustainable
systems of shared beliefs. 45 This allows him to distinguish between for-
mal legal obligations which may become, but are not themselves
institutions, and actual practices-or institutions, which reflect a system
of shared beliefs. According to this definition, the NY Convention may
itself not be an institution, but could become one, if it affects the belief
about a country's willingness to enforce foreign arbitral awards impar-
tially.
IV. THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
ON THE PATTERNS OF TRADE
We test the impact of the NY Convention on the shared beliefs about
a country's prospects of impartial contract enforcement by analyzing the
effect the ratification of the convention has on trade patterns on the one
hand, and on perception of domestic institutional quality on the other.
We do this by exploiting the time variation in ratifying the convention
across countries. The NY Convention was originally signed by twenty-
four countries, fifteen of which are in our database.46 Not all countries
that signed the convention ratified it immediately. Belgium, for example,
ratified the convention only in 1975, and Argentina in 1989. One signa-
tory country, Pakistan, has not ratified the convention to this day. The
additional 110 countries that ratified the Convention have done so over
44. DOUGLASS CECIL NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 3-4 (1990). Note that North clearly distinguishes institutions from organiza-
tions. According to this terminology, a court or arbitration tribunal is an organization, not an
institution. For a review of related literatures in political sciences on institutions and their
definitions, see Peter A. Hall & R. C. R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institu-
tionalisms, 44 POL. STUD. 936-57 (1996).
45. MASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 10 (2001).
46. These countries are Argentina, Belgium, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, India,
Israel, Jordan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sweden, and Switzerland.
The other signatory countries are Belarus, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Luxemburg,
Monaco, Poland, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.
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time. The United States ratified the convention in 1970, the United
Kingdom in 1975, but Brazil, for example, only in 2002. .
We find that ratifying the NY Convention does indeed have a meas-
urable impact on a country's trading patterns.48 In countries that have
ratified the NY Convention, the quality of domestic institutions is some-
what less important for complex goods exports than for countries that
have not yet signed the convention. Put differently, countries that have
ratified the convention now export more complex goods even in the ab-
sence of high marks on domestic institutional quality.
V. EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ON THE PERCEIVED
QUALITY OF DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS
These empirical results are consistent with the notion that ratifica-
tion of the NY Convention triggers a process of institutionalization.
Countries signal their commitment to abide by international rules by rati-
fying the NY Convention. And foreign entrepreneurs respond to this
signal by collectively changing their trading behavior. The missing ele-
ment in this account is the channel through which the NY Convention as
an international institution affects economic outcomes. We analyze this
channel first by exploring statistically the impact of the NY Convention
on the perception indices for institutional quality. Second, we conduct a
more detailed analysis of one country-Indonesia-to identify possible
domestic reforms that may have accompanied or re-enforced the adop-
tion of the convention. The purpose of the case study analysis is to assess
the relative importance of signaling on the one hand, and substantive
institutional (or organizational) change on the other.
In theory, there are various ways in which a country may try to sig-
nal a friendly business environment. It may, for example, unilaterally
declare that it will from now on play by the rules. Such a unilateral dec-
laration may not be very compelling, however, especially in countries
with a weak track record of property rights protection and contract en-
forcement. A more credible signaling strategy is to enter into a legally
binding commitment, by, for example, becoming a party to an interna-
tional convention. The signing or even ratification of an international
convention, however, does not guarantee that a country will implement
and enforce the rules specified therein. Since the international commu-
nity cannot easily police and enforce compliance, ratifying a convention
47. For a detailed analysis of Brazil's accession to the NY Convention, see JAN KLEIN-
HEISTERKAMP, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE SOUTHERN COE OF THE
AMERICAS (2004)(forthcoming).
48. For detailed statistical results see BMP supra note 3, t.4.
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creates a commitment, but on its own does not imply institutional
change. Still, ratifying an international convention is a more credible
signal than a unilateral declaration, because deviations will be noticed
not only as domestic aberrations, but as violations of the international
legal order as well. Indeed, we find strong evidence that the ratification
of the NY Convention affects the perception of a country's institutional
quality even after controlling for openness to trade, GDP per capita, or
for ratifying the CISG, which harmonizes important aspects of contract
law (see Tables la and lb).4 '9 This result indicates that signaling effects
work independently of tangible legal reforms. We find it especially
noteworthy that according to our regression results, ratifying the NY
Convention alone may not be sufficient to convey a signal, but ratifying
50it without reservation almost always does. Unfortunately, we cannot
control for reform efforts in our statistical analysis, as detailed data on
micro-institutional reforms are not available for a large set of countries.
Instead, we conduct a case study of a single country.
49. Because all regressions include country-fixed effects, our coefficients capture the
effect of actually signing the NY convention between 1980 and 1997 on perception indices.
Surprisingly, openness as measured by the share of exports and imports in GDP has no ex-
planatory power for the quality of legal institutions, casting doubt on the relevance of the
endogeneity issue that will be further discussed below.
50. This can be seen from the coefficient on the variable "NYC and NYC without res-
ervation combined:" while the coefficient on "NY-convention" measures the effect of ratifying
the convention with or without reservations, the coefficient on NY-convention without reserva-
tions" measures the additional effect of ratifying it without reservation. The combined





THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
ON PERCEPTION OF LEGAL QUALITY
Corruption in Rule of Law
Government
NY-convention -0.30 -0.29 -0.18 0.47' 0.45' 0.22
(-1.59) (-1.54) (-1.18) (2.65) (2.49) (0.82)
NY-convention without 0.98' 0.97' 0.86b 1.16' 1.18, 1.16
c
reservations (2.55) (2.53) (2.31) (3.15) (3.21) (2.75)
CISG -0.07 -0.11 0.16 -0.26"
(-1.23) (-1.11) (1.58) (-2.40)




NYC and NYC without 0.68b 0.68b 0.68b 1.63' 1.63' 1.38'
Reservations Combined (2.04) (2.03) (2.01) (5.08) (5.07) (4.11)
Adjusted R-squared 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.74 0.74 0.79
Number of Observations 1,002 1,002 954 1,002 1,002 954
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TABLE I B
THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS




NY-Convention 1.51' 1.35' 0.80 1.96' 1.84' 1.49'
(3.39) (2.86) (1.13) (3.65) (3.21) (1.88)
NY-Convention without 0.68 0.84 0.77 1.34' 1.46' 1.27
Reservations (0.59) (0.72) (0.53) (1.94) (2.03) (1.26)
CISG 1.24' 0.58 0.92' 0.28
(4.05) (1.58) (3.66) (0.93)




NYC and NYC without 2.19b 2.19b 1.58 3.30' 3.30' 2.75'
Reservations Combined (2.07) (2.07) (1.23) (7.60) (7.60) (4.39)
Adjusted R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.51 0.52 0.60
Number of Observations 962 962 954 962 962 914
In the preceding tales, all regressions include country-fixed effects. Robust t-statistics are
adjusted for clustering on the country-level and are presented in parenthesis. , b, and ' indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The coefficient and t-statistic
on "NYC and NYC without Reservations Combined" is calculated as a linear combination of
the two corresponding coefficients.
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VI. CASE STUDY: INDONESIA
Indonesia has experienced the greatest change in the perception in-
dices during the period covered by our statistical analysis (1980-1992).
During the same period, Indonesia also witnessed one of the greatest
changes in the ratio of simple versus complex goods exports.' This
country is thus a perfect case for analyzing the relation between institu-
tional change and changes in trade patterns. We examine the locus,
timing, and effect of institutional reforms related to international trade
and investment and compare these changes with changes in perception
indices. We find that it is difficult to relate changes in perception data to
specific legal or judicial reform activities, but we observe trends that, at
least in some cases, seem to have been triggered by institutional events.
Indonesia's economic history in the post World War II era is com-
monly divided into two major periods, the one before and the one after
1966. Here, 1966 signals the shift from predominantly socialist to a
more market based approach to economic policy. 2 The period after 1966
can be further subdivided into periods of decisive economic liberaliza-
tion between 1967 and 1972, and again between 1985 and 1992. In
comparison, the years between 1972 and 1985 were characterized by a
more cautious approach to economic liberalism.53 Finally, the East Asian
Financial crisis of 1997-98 was another watershed both politically and
economically, which refocused attention on institution building as a
prerequisite for economic, and especially financial, liberalization. 4 In-
donesia attracted substantial amounts of foreign direct investments in the
early 1970s that compared favorably with other high performing
51. BMP, supra note 3, t.2.
52. HAL HILL, THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY 3-4 (2d ed. 2000).
53. In this latter period, most indicators of legal quality in Indonesia doubled, and ex-
ports of complex goods relative to simple goods to the countries in our sample increased by a
factor of 14 including oil and 2.6 excluding oil. See Figures 1 and 2 below, respectively.
54. The extent to which the crisis may have been caused by weak legal institutions is
disputed. For an argument and empirical evidence suggesting that the quality of institutions
had an impact at least on the severity of the crisis in a given country, see Simon Johnson et al.,
Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 141 (2000). For an
argument highlighting the weaknesses in corporate governance institutions, see MICHAEL
POMERLEANO, THE EAST ASIA CRISIS AND CORPORATE FINANCES: THE UNTOLD MICRO
STORY (1998). Critically, however, see STEVEN RADELET & JEFFREY SACHS, THE ONSET OF
THE EAST ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS, (Harv. Inst. for Int'l. Dev. Working Paper, 1998) available
at http://www2.cid.harvard.edu/hiidpapers/eaonset2.pdf (arguing that financial panic was the
primary culprit and that institutions were at best secondary). For a regularly updated list of
articles analyzing the East Asian financial crisis, see Basic Readings and References on the
Causes of the Crisis, available at http://www.stem.nyu.edu/globalmacro/asian-crisis/basic_
readings.html.
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countries in the region, such as Taiwan and Korea.55 Yet, simple products
such as petrol oil and agricultural products accounted for the over-
whelming share of exports. As an oil producer Indonesia benefited
substantially from the increase in oil prices between 1974 and 1982. Ac-
tual income from oil revenues frequently surpassed forecasted income-
56at times by a factor of four-for most of this period . The oil boom may
even have undermined investments in institution building, as the gov-
ernment had few incentives to invest there.57 The major challenge came
when oil prices declined in the early 1980s and investors' interest in In-
donesia decreased. It was then that the government realized the need for
providing a more attractive investment environment and for diversifying
the export portfolio away from oil and other natural resources (i.e. sim-
ple goods) to manufacturing (i.e. complex goods).
Several important reforms were introduced in the early 1980s aimed
at improving Indonesia's trading and investment position. As a result of
these reform measures the share of manufactured exports (i.e. complex
goods) increased from only seven percent of total exports in 1983 to over
fifty percent by 1992.58 The reform package that precipitated this change
consisted of policy change, signaling devices, and institution building.
By policy change we mean changes in trade and investment policies and
related regulatory intervention, such as the lowering of import and ex-
port duties or the abolishment of investment licenses. While these
reforms require institutional adaptations, their importance lies in opening
or closing a country to trade and investment, not in building or reforming
institutions that support trade relations. These reforms signal to the rest
of the world that a country is willing to play by certain rules. Finally,
institutional reforms consist of efforts aimed at improving the rule and
functioning of legal institutions such as courts, customs authorities, and
the like. Disentangling the impact of each of these reform measures on
outcome is difficult, if not impossible. We find strong evidence that pol-
icy reforms as well as signaling affected Indonesia's trading patterns.
They also affected the perception of the country's institution by the out-
55. Andrew Maclntyre, Investment, Property Rights, and Corruption in Indonesia, in
CORRUPTION: THE BOOM AND BUST OF EAST ASIA 25 (J. Edgardo Campos ed., 2001). See
Figures 3 and 4 and accompanying text at 28.
56. HILL, supra note 52, at 97-98.
57. For a general argument along these lines, namely that natural resources creates
windfall profits that create disincentives for the ruling class to engage in sensible economic
policies, see Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew Warner, The Big Push, Natural Resource Booms and
Growth, 59 J. DEV. ECON. 43 (1999)
58. Maclntyre, supra note 55, at 171. Summarizing these reform measures and their
impact on Indonesia's exports, Hill states "[t]here can be little doubt that the packages have
transformed Indonesian industry from a protected, inward-looking sector to one which is in-
creasingly outward-looking and internationally competitive." HILL, supra note 52, at 117.
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side world. Sustaining the effect of signaling, however, seems to have
required additional reform efforts, at least in the presence of evidence
that weakened the original signaling effect.
In the early 1980s, Indonesia took a series of measures to streamline
its licensing system and to re-liberalize imports and exports, which had
been restricted in the 1970s. These changes marked a shift towards a
more open trade and investment policy regime. Exporters were allowed
to import inputs tariff-free or to get reimbursed for duties paid. 9 Quanti-
tative restrictions were abolished in favor of tariffs in October 1986, and
subsequent years witnessed a gradual reduction in tariffs. These policies
were pursued well into the 1990s. In a 1998 report, the WTO attests the
Indonesian government followed investment policies over the last twenty
years that "have generally been beneficial to the export sector."
6
These policy changes were accompanied by some institutional re-
forms, most notably the reform of Indonesia's customs service. In 1985 a
presidential decree reallocated the power to verify all imports with a
value exceeding US$5,000 at the point of export to a Swiss surveillance
firm, SGS. 6' The measure was taken to curb corruption in the customs
apparatus. The reform was remarkable not only because it had a measur-
able impact on the flow of goods across borders, 62 but because it
demonstrated the government's willingness to relinquish sovereign
rights-the customs inspection of goods entering the country-in order
to fight corruption. In a similar move, the cotton import monopoly was
disbanded and its senior officials fired again under corruption allega-
tions.63 None of these measures had the impact of eliminating corruption
or even reducing it substantially, and this is correctly reflected by the
perception indices: perceived corruption actually worsened during that
time.6 They curtailed corruption where it was probably most sensitive to
foreign traders and investors, however, and thus may have enhanced the
overall credibility of Indonesia as an attractive destination for business.
Indonesia also ratified several international conventions. In 1980 it
ratified CISG, and in 1982 the NY Convention.65 Prior to that, the Dutch
59. HILL, supra note 52, at 116. Maclntyre, supra note 55, at 37.
60. See the WTO's trade policy review for Indonesia, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/tpr..e/tp94_e.htm at 3.
61. HILL, supra note 52, at 116. Maclntyre, supra note 55, at 37.
62. HILL, supra note 52, at 116 (stating that "the effect of the decree.., was to greatly
expedite the flow of goods through Indonesia's airports and harbors, and to increase govern-
ment tariff revenue").
63. Id.
64. See Figure 2 below.
65. In ratifying the Convention, Indonesia opted for both of the reservations allowed by
the Convention: the awarding arbitration tribunal must be situated in a country that is also a
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Civil Code, which had remained in force after independence, stipulated
that judgments of foreign courts (including arbitration courts) were not
enforceable in Indonesia.66 Indonesian courts continued to refuse to en-
force foreign awards even after Indonesia became a party to the NY
Convention, however, on the grounds that the implementing regulations
had not been promulgated.67 This was still the holding in a 1989 case, in
which the Indonesian Supreme Court blocked the enforcement of an
English arbitral award for a Bulgarian Shipping Company.68 The formal
justification for the delay in implementation was a dispute over which
court would be responsible for administering foreign awards.69 Only in
1990, i.e. ten years after Indonesia signed the NY Convention, did the
Indonesian Supreme Court issue an implementing regulation, Supreme
Court Regulation 1/90, codifying procedures for the enforcement of for-
eign arbitral awards. The delay in creating the institutional prerequisite
for implementing the NY Convention suggests that the ratification of an
international convention may not amount to much in real terms absent
additional institutional reforms (without which the legal commitments
undertaken therein cannot be implemented).0 In this context, it is note-
worthy that the measures for contract enforcement and expropriation risk
both improved dramatically after 1989 and stabilized at a very high level
thereafter.7'
Under Regulation 1/90 the Indonesian Supreme Court was responsi-
ble for issuing the exequatur orders for enforcement of foreign awards.
The initial nine applications for enforcing a foreign arbitral award to the
supreme court between 1991 and mid-1993 were acted on reasonably
punctually and most of them proceeded to execution without further
problems.72
The case E.D. & F Man (Sugar) Ltd. v. Yani Haryanto (hereinafter
Man v. Haryanto) was an exception. Man v. Haryanto was the first case
submitted to the Supreme Court after Regulation 1/90 had been adopted.
Man had won an arbitration award in London against Haryanto and had
party to the NY Convention; and the matter must be related to the field of "commercial" law
as defined by national law. See supra note 42.
66. Karen Mills, Judicial Attitudes to Enforcement of Arbitral Awards and other Judi-
cial Involvement in Arbitration in Indonesia, 68 ARB. J. INST. ARB. 106, 106 (2002)(quoting
Article 463 of the Dutch Civil Code, the Burgelijke Reglement of de Rechtvordering).
67. Robert N. Homick, Indonesian Arbitration in Theory and Practice, 39 AM. J.
COMP. L. 559, 574 (1991).
68. Id.
69. Mills, supra note 66, at 106.
70. See Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing
Economies, 50 Am. J. CoMP. L. 97 (2002) (on the use of legal harmonization as a formal sig-
naling device).
71. See Figure 2 below.
72. Pistor, supra note 70, at 107.
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even obtained an enforcement order (exequatur) from the Indonesian
Supreme Court. Haryanto then brought an action in Jakarta district court,
arguing that the contract was invalid, and that therefore the arbitration
clause, which formed the basis for the London tribunal's authority to rule
on the case, was void. The district court and a higher court found for
Haryanto. Man appealed to the supreme court, which also ruled in favor
of Haryanto, and nullified the exequatur order it had earlier issued on
behalf of Man.73 Under the NY Convention, it is possible to claim that
the contract, including its arbitration clause, is void. The stipulation of
the voidance exception is, however, rather narrow and allows only for
voidance on the ground that the parties were "under some incapacity".
Therefore, "the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the
parties have subjected their agreement, or failing any indication thereon,
under the law of the country where the award was made. 74 In other
words, voidance under Indonesian law does not suffice. Nevertheless, the
possibility of challenging the validity of the contract opens the door for
local courts in the law enforcing country to set aside an award in a man-
ner that is formally consistent with the convention. Moreover, the award
could be set aside even when it violates the convention's spirit and at the
same time hurts the reputation of that country.
Man v. Haryanto was an early setback for enforcement of foreign
awards. Yet, Indonesia's record improved. In subsequent years, the Su-
preme Court rejected only one other application for exequatur, in Sikinos
Maritime Ltd. (Malta) v. PD. Perdata Lot (hereinafter Sikinos v. Per-
data). In this case, the Indonesian Supreme Court refused to enforce the
London award on the grounds that the parties had not agreed to arbi-
trate.75 Under the NY Convention the parties' written agreement to
arbitrate disputes is a sine qua non for its application. The question
whether the parties have in fact agreed to submit a particular matter to
arbitration creates another potential loophole for the implementation of
the convention.76 In Sikinos v. Perdata, the Indonesian company P.D.
Perdata Lot was able to use this loophole to its benefit at home, even
though the London arbitration tribunal had found no reason to doubt the
parties' agreement to arbitrate. The reported non-enforcement cases have
been the exception rather than the rule since the adoption of the Supreme
Court Regulation 1/90. Nevertheless, writing in 1998, Sudargo Gautama,
73. Id. at 112.
74. NY Convention, supra note 42, at art. V. 1 (a).
75. See Sudargo Gautama, Indonesia, in INT'L HANDBOOK ON COMM. ARB. 33 (1998).
76. NY Convention supra note 42, at art. V.1(c) (recognition and enforcement of an
award may be refused if it "deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within
the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope
of the submission to arbitration...)"
Fall 2004]
Michigan Journal of International Law
the Indonesian jurist who represented Haryanto in the 1991 case, still
describes enforcement of foreign awards as "difficult and time consum-
ing.",
77
Indonesia's reluctance to accept foreign settlements of disputes in-
volving Indonesian companies is also reflected in a widely publicized
case concerning the settlement of an investment dispute. Indonesia is not
only a party to the NY Convention on arbitration, but also to the 1965
Washington Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes,
which created the International Center for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID).78 Unlike the NY Convention, which governs arbitra-
tion agreements among two non-state parties, ICSID governs disputes
between States and "members" (i.e. legal or natural persons) of other
States. By ratifying the convention, Member States commit to having a
neutral tribunal preside over disputes with foreign investors who may not
trust their domestic institutions. Indonesia's first ICSID arbitration was
Amco Asia Corporation v. Indonesia.9 The case involved the seizure of a
Jakarta hotel which had been constructed by a U.S. and Hong Kong
Company, and was to be operated in a profit sharing arrangement with a
company affiliated with the Indonesian Army. Following the completion
of the building, Amco was to lease the complex for several years to re-
coup its investments. This was preempted by P.T. Wisma, the Indonesian
company with Army connections that owned the site of the buildings,
taking over control of the complex in 1980. ICSID arbitration was filed
in 1981, and Amco won an award in 1984. Indonesia contested the
award. In a review process following ICSID procedures, the award was
annulled in 1986.80 Amco resubmitted the dispute in 1987, and received
another award in 1990. Indonesia attempted to have the second award
annulled in 1990, but this was denied and in 1992, that is over ten years
after it had been filed, the dispute was finally resolved in Amco's favor.
The problems foreign parties have encountered with the Indonesian
formal legal system are symptomatic of the relevance of formal law (or
rather the lack thereof) during Indonesia's remarkable growth experience
since the late 1960s. The problems also stem from the country's integra-
tion into the world economy since the mid-1980s. Writing in 1991,
Cheryl Gray concludes a survey of the role of formal law in Indonesia
77. Gautama, supra note 75.
78. World Bank, List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention,
available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/constate/c-states-en.htm.
79. Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia. 24 ILM 1022 (1983).
80. The problems that surfaced in this case have in part been attributed to inherent
flaws of the ICSID Convention. See Monroe Leigh, ICSID Arbitral Decision: AMCO Asia
Corporation v. Republic of Indonesia, 81 AM. J. INT'L. L. (1987).
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asserting that it plays only a "minor" role in the Indonesian economy."
Presidential decrees or administrative acts are used to regulate economic
activities more or less on an ad hoc basis, but horizontal relations among
non-state actors are resolved primarily informally. A widely cited-
though never published-report by the World Bank on Indonesia's legal
system concluded that the overall impact was a state of "lawlessness."82
And Gray herself characterizes the legal system as lacking "clear consis-
tent and binding standards. Laws may be contradicted by lower-level
decrees and regulations, and both may be contradicted by the day-to-day
actions of administrators."83 Foreign legal assistance tried to improve the
situation by introducing Western style legal reforms. The United States
funded a major legal reform project called Economic Law, Institutional
and Professional Strengthening in 1 9 9 4 .
8 Moreover, Indonesia's formal
accession to the WTO in 1995 triggered the overhaul of its commercial
code and intellectual property protections. Yet, there is widespread
agreement that the formal legal changes that were introduced in the early
1990s had little effect on how business was done in Indonesia. Informal-
ity and patronage systems continued to dominate formal legal
85arrangements.
Throughout this period of attempted reforms, successful reforms,
and events that sometimes supported, but on other occasions undermined
reform efforts, Indonesia's trade patterns and most, though not all, per-
ception indicators changed significantly. There was a dramatic change in
the composition of Indonesia's export portfolio between 1982 and 1992.
The ratio of complex products to simple product exports (in U.S. dollar
values) increased by 264%, making Indonesia one of the great increasers
of complex goods exports in our sample.86 We present the changes in the
81. Cheryl Gray, Legal Process and Economic Development: A Case Study of Indone-
sia, 19 WORLD DE. 763,771 (1991).
82. The report by McCawley is quoted extensively in HILL, supra note 52 at 118.
83. Gray, supra note 81 at 772.
84. ELIPS was initially funded with US $22 million. It was followed by ELIPS-II also
designed primarily with a focus on commercial law, arbitration, etc., but was in the aftermath
of September 1 Ith increasingly used to help Indonesia combat terrorism. See Order 821: In-
donesia Economic Law, Institutional and Professional Strengthening (ELIPS-II) Activity, 2002
Annual Report (2003), available at http://www.dec.org/pdf-docs/PDABX574.pdf.
85. Writing in 1996, Root contrasts the Indonesian example with other successful Asian
economies. "Indonesia's weak civil institutions have meant that the functioning of the econ-
omy is more dependent on social institutions than any other East Asian Economy" See
HILTON ROOT, SMALL COUNTRIES BIG LESSONS: GOVERNANCE AND THE RISE OF EAST ASIA
91 (1996). He describes Indonesia as a network economy that relies strongly on family ties as
well as on relations between government and business that are often intermediated by key
persons in the military. Id. at 103, 110.
86. This ratio does not include oil exports, which were subject to strongly falling prices
during that time period. Including oil exports (Indonesia's most important simple goods ex-
port), the change in this ratio is a staggering 1,406%. See BMP supra note 3, at Table lb.
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composition of Indonesia's exports on Figure 1. The graph indicates 7
that Indonesia experienced a major boost in exports of complex goods,
while simple goods exports remained almost constant.
FIGURE I
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Regarding measures of the quality of Indonesia's institutions, we
find substantial change on all dimensions (see Figure 2 below). Notably,
in the early 1980s Indonesia's ranking on expropriation risk and contract
enforcement was much higher than rule of law, bureaucratic quality and
corruption. In fact, bureaucratic efficiency and corruption improved little
until the early 1990s, and corruption even worsened initially. The decline
in Indonesia's corruption ranking in the mid-1980s is notable particu-
larly in light of the fact that in 1985 the customs service reform was
implemented. A possible explanation for these somewhat contradictory
trends could be that foreign observers realized that the reform was local-
ized and did not address the endemic corruption. Yet, the custom service
reform eased the burden of corruption on them and thereby reduced the
risk of (indirect) expropriation.
87. Figure 1 includes data for the two types of single goods identified by Rauch,
namely goods traded on international commodities exchanges, and goods with international
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The most striking development for our purposes is the volatility of
the contract enforcement indicator until the early 1990s. Indonesia's
ranking for contract enforcement improved in the first half of the
1 980s-after Indonesia opened its borders and ratified the NY Conven-
tion. This was, however, followed by a steep decline until 1988. This
change in perception may have been the result of Indonesia's poor en-
forcement record, as evidenced by the refusal of Indonesian courts to
enforce foreign arbitral awards prior to 1990, and by the highly publi-
cized Amco case discussed above.88 By the early 1990s the downward
trend was reversed by an even steeper upward trend. This change in per-
ception data precedes the Indonesian Supreme Court's issuing of
implementing regulations for the NY Convention, but may have antici-
pated this change in response to Indonesia's previous enforcement
record. Other factors that may account for the reversal of the trend in
1988 were Indonesia's adoption of a package of regulatory reforms, in-
cluding easing of foreign investment rules and capital markets as well as
new banking regulations. These formal legal changes have been attrib-
uted to Indonesia's shift from being primarily an oil exporter to a major
manufacturing exporter.8 These changes were introduced by government
regulations. A further set of investment and commercial laws directed not
only at liberalizing economic activities, but creating an infrastructure to
88. See Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, supra note 79.
89. See JOHN BALL, INDONESIAN LAW AT THE CROSSROADS (2000) (1996). These legal
changes were part of a liberalization package introduced in October/November 1988. Accord-
ing to Ball, the government "simplified foreign investment rules, making it easier and more
attractive for foreign investors to invest in Indonesia, freed-up inter-island shipping, and
opened up steel and plastic imports to private traders." Id. at 7.2.
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support growing commercial activities, was passed in 1994-95-only
two years before the East Asian financial crisis, and thus too early to
fully implement the reform efforts.9°
With hindsight, Indonesia's scores on the perception indices may
still have been far too high. In 1997 the East Asian financial crisis trig-
gered the collapse of the Suharto regime and resulted in capital flight,
economic contraction, and substantial violence. Few of these events had
been anticipated. Nevertheless, the actual behavior of foreign entrepre-
neurs suggests that they were well aware that many of their investment
decisions had been based on signaling effects. Accordingly, they quickly
reversed their risk assessment once real world events proved them
wrong. Consequently, the debate over whether institutional flaws or in-
vestor panic caused the crisis could be resolved as follows:9' Investors
panicked during what may have been only a temporary economic down-
turn, because they were aware that the existing institutional
arrangements might not be sustainable.92 Following the crisis, Indonesia
has made important efforts to improve institutional quality once more
relying primarily on formal legal change. Examples include the adoption
of a new bankruptcy 93 and corporate law, and a series of banking legisla-
tion.94 Many of these changes were imposed by IMF loan conditions. In
contrast to international conventions, conditions for IMF loans can be
enforced by withholding loan payments. Yet, the adoption or even the
enactment of a new law is only a weak indicator for real institutional
change, as formal laws may be ignored or implemented differently than
anticipated. Some reform efforts, however, have gone beyond statutory
change. Most notably, Indonesia has begun to overhaul its judiciary. The
executive was restrained by judicial independence rules from firing par-
tisan corrupt judges, and has instead reverted to "packing" the courts
with non-career judges drawn from academia and the legal profession.
Whether these reforms will enhance the role of law and legal institutions
in Indonesia remains to be seen. Recent media reports suggest that this
reform may stop short of the Indonesian Supreme Court as parliament is
apparently preparing a law that reserves seats on the supreme court only
for career judges.95
90. See id. at 7.121 (specific discussion on these reforms).
91. See supra note 54.
92. Id.
93. Stacey Steele, The New Law on Bankruptcy in Indonesia: Towards a Modem Cor-
porate Bankruptcy Regime, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 144 (1999).
94. Including a new Banking law, and a Central Bank Law. See the WTO's trade policy
review for Indonesia cited supra note 60. See also BALL, supra note 89.
95. See Indonesia: Judicial reform faces Parliamentary hurdle (ABC Radio Australia
broadcast), available at http://www.abc.net.au/ra/asiapac/programs/s 1024927.htm.
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The impact of these reform efforts on the perception of the quality of
Indonesia's institutions remains unclear. While rule of law rankings have
improved again since 1998,96 investors remain skeptical about corrup-
tion 97 and political stability.98 There is little objective evidence that the
investment environment is indeed less secure than it was in 1997 just
before the crisis. As our data suggest, however, perception matters. The
real problem for Indonesia and other countries whose credibility as at-
tractive trading partners or investment destinations has been undermined
is that simple signaling devices are less effective now for attracting for-
eign business.
VII. MEASURING INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY
WITH PERCEPTION DATA
Our empirical results and our case study analysis rely heavily on
perception indices of institutional quality; thus, this raises the question
of whether or not these indices are appropriate measures. In a recent pa-
per, Glaeser et al. criticize the use of perception data for this purpose.
99
Specifically, they ask whether subjective assessments of institutions do
indeed measure what they call "objective institutional rules." They also
raise the issue that perception indicators may be highly endogenous, i.e.
that respondents to these surveys allocate higher scores to relatively rich
countries that may or may not have good institutions.'
° Applied to our
focus on trade, the latter concern suggests that if countries that score
well on perceptual institutional measures trade more with the rest of the
world, they may in fact be capturing the importance of national wealth
rather than institutions on trade. Drawing this concern to its conclusion
but reserving causality, our results would then be simply driven by the
impact of trade on national income and wealth.
96. The most recent data on institutional quality are available from the World Bank's
Governance Research database, available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/govemance/
govdatasets?. The indexing differs from the ICRG data we have used in our regression analy-
sis and in Tables la and lb. However, they use similar survey instruments. According to these
data, using a 0 to 100 scale, Indonesia occupied the 39.8th percentile rank on rule of law in
1996 the year before the crisis, went down to 14.1 in 1998, but scored again at 23.2 percentiles
in 2002.
97. According to the World Bank's database, Indonesia was at 35.3 percentiles in 1996,
but declined to 6.6 percentiles in 1998 and is still at 6.7 percentiles in 2002 (after a small in-
crease to 8.7 in 2000). Id.
98. This variable was not separated out in the ICRG indices. According to the World
Bank's data, political stability was ranked 30.5 percentiles in 1996, 9.1 in 1998, 3.0 in 2000
and 12.4 in 2002. Id.
99. Glaeser et al., supra note 4.
100. Id. at 7.
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There are two aspects to Glaeser et al.'s criticism. First, they indi-
rectly claim that it is doubtful that the experts surveyed are able to
accurately report on the different dimensions of legal quality across
countries. We investigate the validity of this criticism by simply compar-
ing correlations between perception indices and the ratification of the
NY Convention on the one hand, and between perception indices, GDP
growth and trade openness on the other. Uniformly high correlations
among all these variables would be evidence in favor of their criticism as
it suggests that the respondents to surveys querying them about institu-
tional quality are unable to draw distinctions between the different
aspects of institutions. Second, Glaeser et al. argue that causality runs
from trade to the perceived quality of institutions, because trade can in
fact cause national income (which is captured by the perceptual meas-
ures) to increase. Our regression results in tables la and lb do not
support this claim; when we regress the various perceptual measures of
institutions on a set of time varying covariates, we find that the coeffi-
cient on openness is very small and statistically insignificant in all cases.
We will present several arguments why reverse causality may not be pre-
sent, and why it is quite reasonable to interpret perception data as
indicators of the perceived contract and enforcement risk of transacting
with a particular country. Thus, these perception indices largely reflect
both formal change and its actual implementation. Second, we argue that
this interpretation is consistent with the interpretation of institutions as
"sustainable systems of shared beliefs."'' This interpretation is more
relevant for assessing institutional quality from the perspective of entre-
preneurs, but also for students of comparative institutions, than
indicators of formal legal change.
In order to evaluate the criticism that the perceptual indices measure
the quality of institutions poorly, we analyze correlations between the
various perception indices and the correlations between these indices and
indicators for institutional change and economic outcomes (see Table 2).




PERCEPTION INDICES AND INDICATORS FOR INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES
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Rule of Law 0.82 _____
Bureaucratic .4 .7
Quality
Contract 0.3 0.38 0.37
Enforcement 0 . .
Expropriation 0.73 0.80 0.77 0.4
Risk___
NYC 0.32 0.28 0.46 0.20 0.43 
CnvSetion 0.31 0.38 0.32 0.20 0.33 0.27
NYC without 0.09 0.09 0.19 0.06 0.12 0.41 0.23
reservations
GDP per capita 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.37 0.73 0.30 0.36 0.16
Openness 0.26 0.30 0.18 0.24 0.25 -0.02 -0.01 -0.11 0.29
Note: Table 2 reflects the correlation between measures of legal quality, the signing of interna-
tional treaties and economic variables across countries and over time, 1984-1997 (466
observations).
Openness is defined as the share of exports + imports in GDP.
GDP per capita is measured at Purchasing Power Parity exchange rates.
NYC = New York Convention.
NYC without reservation= countries who ratified the convention without making any reserva-
tions.
We find that most perception indices are highly correlated with each
other, with the notable exception of contract enforcement. This suggests
that countries with good institutions are generally good at most dimen-
sions of legal quality, which is what one should expect. The exception of
contract enforcement suggests that participants in the survey are capable
of distinguishing between the different dimensions of institutional qual-
ity. The correlations between openness to trade (measured by imports
plus exports as a share of GDP) and the perception indices are quite
moderate and approximately at the same level as the correlation between
openness and GDP per capita. As we have seen in Tables la and 1b,
there is no indication that increased openness per se leads to an upward
bias in the evaluation of the quality of institutions. Further, we don't see
particular evidence for that connection in the correlation analysis either.
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It is also quite noteworthy that the correlation between signing the NY
convention and the perception data is at similar levels, with contract en-
forcement, the aspect most closely associated with the goals of the NY
Convention, actually exhibiting the lowest correlation with ratifying it.
The same is true for the CISG. Interestingly, however, there is almost a
zero correlation between openness and signing a convention.
This simple inspection of correlations casts some doubt on the ar-
gument that experts surveyed cannot distinguish accurately between
the different dimensions of legal quality. It does not, however, suggest
that experts are unable to distinguish between national wealth and
quality of institutions. But it is also not surprising that many richer
countries can afford to build and to enjoy better quality institutions.
Nevertheless, the case of Indonesia suggests that simply being able to
afford good institutions does not necessarily mean that a country will
in fact develop these institutions. An inspection of Figure 2 suggests
that in the case of Indonesia, where income per capita grew rapidly
during our sample period, the perceived quality of perceived institu-
tions had a non-monotonic dynamic during the same period. We
therefore see little evidence from the data that the survey results are
primarily measures of national wealth.
The simple correlations between openness and signing a conven-
tion are consistent with the view that international institutions that
govern trade do not automatically increase openness per se. As shown
in the previous section, however, they influence trade indirectly: Rati-
fying an international convention sends a signal that domestic
institutions are reliable. This apparently changes traders' perceptions
about the reliability of a country, which in turn influences their trading
behavior. While this does not eliminate the possibility that endogeneity
may be present, it suggests that it might be less severe than suggested
by Glaeser et. al. But trade is only one channel through which surveyed
experts receive information about a country's quality of institutions.
Only to the extent this trade experience influences a country's ranking
in perception indices may reverse-causality (from trade to quality of
institutions) be potentially problematic. In the context of international
trade, we do not, however, find any effect of openness on our percep-
tion indices (see Tables la and lb). These results suggest that the
causality is more likely to run from perceived institutional quality to
economic outcome.
The debate about appropriate measures for institutional quality also
raises the more fundamental question of what institutions are and how
to measure them. There is a strong tendency in the literature on the new
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comparative economics'I02and by multilateral institutions"" to use for-
mal legal indicators for measuring institutions and making inferences
about institutional quality by analyzing the impact of such rules on eco-
nomic outcomes."° Others have pointed out that formal law found on the
books may not be very effective and that absent a better understanding of
the mechanisms by which formal law translates into particular economic
outcomes, such inferences are highly problematic. These arguments rest
on evidence suggesting that there is little relation between formal law on
the books and institutional quality as measured by perception indices.'5
The weak effects Glaeser et. al. find in their regression analysis for
changes in the law on the books is consistent with this view. This is the
case particularly when formal rules are not implemented, as we have
shown in the case study of Indonesia. Consequently, the potential meas-
urement error involved by using formal rules on the books for assessing
institutional quality as suggested by Glaeser et al. may actually be quite
substantial. Ideally, we would like to obtain data both on formal changes
as well as the quality of their implementation. This is not available, how-
ever. Perception data reflect the combination of new rules and the quality
of their implementation combined with how well these changes are
communicated, which may ultimately be what matters for traders. We
conclude that from our perspective, perception data is still the best avail-
able measure for assessing the quality of a country's institutional
environment.
More generally, there is increasing skepticism about the notion that
it is possible to identify a particular set of institutions to promote eco-
nomic growth and development irrespective of initial conditions in
different countries. As Rodrik argued in a recent paper, secure property
rights seem to be fundamental for long-term economic development and
growth. There are multiple ways in which property rights can be secured,
102. Simeon Djankov et al., The New Comparative Economics, 31 J. CoMP. ECON. 595-
619 (2003); Glaeser et al., supra note 4.
103. WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2004 (2004). The Report presents a host of
"objective" indicators ranging from formal legal protections of creditor and shareholder rights
to information on the number of days it takes to register a business for most countries around
the world.
104. Most extensively used are formal legal indicators of shareholder and creditor rights
protection and their impact on financial market development. See Rafael La Porta et al., Legal
Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131-1150 (1997); Rafael La Porta et al., Law
and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113-1155 (1998); Ross Levine, The Legal Environment,
Banks, and Long-Run Economic Growth, 30 J. MONEY, CREDIT, AND BANKING 596-613
(1998).
105. See Katharina Pistor et al., Law and Finance in Transition Economies, 8 EON. OF
TRANSITION 325-68 (2000); Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality, and
the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165-95 (2003); Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolu-
tion of Corporate Law, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L. ECON. L. 791-871 (2002).
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however, and the formal legal system is only one of them.' °6 Other means
by which property rights may be secured include informal norms, °7 en-
forcement mechanisms within business networks,',0 or government
assurances, including formal guarantees. ° As Rodrik put it, "the impor-
tant point is that effective institutional outcomes do not map into unique
institutional designs. And since there is no unique mapping from func-
tion to form, it is futile to look for non-contingent empirical regularities
that link specific legal rules to economic outcomes."0 Measuring institu-
tional quality with perception indicators is consistent with this line of
reasoning. We also contend that this "bottom line" approach is precisely
what foreign entrepreneurs are looking for when they decide to trade or
not to trade with a particular country. The fact that perception indices
have been compiled by companies that make a living of selling these
data to potential traders and investors certainly suggests that investors
are willing to pay for this information. Because information is scarce for
most countries, this may not be surprising. Moreover, it does not imply
that investors would not be willing to pay more for objective measures of
institutional quality, were that information available. Still, entrepreneurs
are likely to be interested primarily in whether they are entering a hostile
or friendly business environment. While our data suggest that they find
formal legal commitments reassuring, they also indicate that at the in-
vesting stage, they will pay less attention to the content or
implementation of these commitments.
106. See Dani Rodrik, Getting Institutions Right (April 2004), available at
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/-drodrik/ifo-institutions%20article%20oApril%202004_.pdf; see
also Dani Rodrik, Institutions for High Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire
Them, STUDIES IN COMP. INT'L DEV. 3 (Fall 2000).
107. Informal norms are common in legally-sophisticated countries. See Stewart Macau-
lay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963).
108. An interesting study finds that foreign investors in India prefer investments in busi-
ness groups over investments in unaffiliated companies despite the fact that groups have a
reputation for less transparency. See Tarun Khanna and Krishna Palepu, Emerging Market
Business Groups, Foreign Investors, and Corporate Governance, in CONCENTRATED CORPO-
RATE OWNERSHIP, 265 (Randall K. Morck, ed., 2000). Their interpretation suggests that
groups offer important assurances to foreign investors in an environment where political lob-
bying is crucial for economic success. See id. at 272.
109. Such guarantees are particularly important for large-scale project financing. See
Benjamin Esty, Creditor Rights, Enforcement, and Debt Ownership Structure: Evidence from
the Global Syndicated Loan Market (2002) (unpublished manuscript) available at
http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRNID320226_code020730600.pdf?abstractid+320226&mirid=l. Note
however that the World Bank offers similar guarantees for investors to developing countries
through MIGA, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. See generally
http://www.miga.org (2005).




In this paper we have presented evidence on the relation between in-
stitutions and patterns of international trade. We measured institutions
and institutional change by using perception data of institutional quality.
Our findings suggest that the perceived quality of domestic institutions
matters for a country's participation in international trade. Domestic in-
stitutions reduce international transaction costs. High quality institutions
indicate that foreign investors are reasonably assured that they can en-
force a contract by using legal institutions in that country, if need be.
Given that complex goods are more prone to disputes for reasons related
to incompleteness of contracts, higher scores on institutional quality in-
crease a country's propensity to export complex goods. By contrast,
countries that fail to improve institutional quality may wind up in a low
equilibrium trap of exporting primarily simple rather than complex
goods with relatively limited prospects of diversifying into more lucra-
tive complex goods markets. In addition, high quality institutions reduce
transaction costs at home, which again benefits complex goods more
than simple goods.
We also found that international institutions matter. Countries that
have ratified the NY Convention, for example, are able to improve their
position in international trade flows, even when domestic institutional
quality has not caught up. In particular, ratifying the NY Convention en-
hances a country's trade in complex goods. This suggests that to the
extent countries can credibly commit to complying with international
norms, international law may substitute for weak legal institutions.
The channel through which international institutions affect trade
flows, however, is indirect. Ratifying an international legal instrument
signals a country's willingness to play by the rules set forth therein. This
influences the perception of firms from that country as reliable trading
partners. Indeed, our results indicate that ratifying the NY Convention
changes both the perception of institutional quality and trade flows.
These changes occur even in the absence of real reform. Sustaining these
effects requires a certain level of compliance, however. Our case study of
Indonesia revealed that while ratifying the NY Convention may send a
strong signal, failure to comply with its rules can undermine a country's
credibility as a trading partner. Regaining credibility may require more
than just signaling. Instead, it might call for tangible reforms at home
and a track record of implementing them. This interpretation of our re-
sults is consistent with the notion of institutions as "sustainable systems
of shared beliefs." Signaling affects perceptions, which in turn
111. AOKI, supra note 45.
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influence behavior. This may result in a positive feedback loop. As long
as both parties play by the rules, the system becomes self-sustaining.
Should one party, however, take actions that undermine the signaling
effect, the system may collapse.
Finally, because our evidence employs time-varying perception indi-
ces of institutional quality, we checked for the extent to which this data
pick up quality of institutions versus national wealth as suggested by
Glaeser et al. 2 Using simple correlation and regression analysis, we
found evidence that suggests that these perception measures reflect do-
mestic enforcement of contracts and property rights and the quality of
domestic legal institutions fairly well. And, they also pick up, albeit im-
perfectly, a country's willingness to abide by international rules of
arbitration in international trade. It is important to interpret them not as
measures of formal changes, however, but as the overall evaluation of
legal institutional arrangements.
112. See Glaeser et al., supra note 4.
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